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INTRODUCTION
E-discovery, or the process that compels litigants to share elec-
tronically stored information and documents, has become the most
prominent form of information sharing in modern-day litigation. It
is also the most expensive. Data is produced at rates never thought
possible. Documents are backed up many times over and replicated
many times more. The information is then stored indefinitely,
accruing to vast volumes which make traditional paper discovery
file-box storerooms pale in comparison. Producing this electronically
stored information during discovery becomes incredibly expensive.1
Rising e-discovery costs over the past several decades have made
the current system for allocating discovery expenses prone to
exploitation.2 Because the current discovery rules were designed to
deal with paper discovery, they place the burden of e-discovery costs
largely on the producing party.3 Plaintiffs take advantage of this
and leverage high e-discovery costs to settle weak, meritless, and e-
ven frivolous claims.4 By intentionally making overbroad e-discovery
requests, requesting parties drive up the producing party’s e-dis-
covery bill.5 Producing parties have no choice but to settle or pay
exorbitant discovery costs—regardless of whether they are likely to
win or lose on the merits of the actual case.6
Some courts have attempted to solve this problem by shifting e-
discovery costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.7 Section 1920 allows for
courts to tax certain litigation costs against the losing party.8 This
method does not adequately address the problem, however, because
it vests the court with an optional and controversial power instead
1. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (noting that modern e-
discovery is a “potentially enormous expense”).
2. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549-51 (2010).
3. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost
Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 774-75 (2011).
4. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 549, 574.
5. See Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
481, 500 (1994); Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 802-03.
6. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 550-51.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012). 
8. Id.
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of creating a set, predictable rule.9 Consequently, courts sparsely
use and unevenly apply § 1920 to tax e-discovery costs, leaving the
parties uncertain as to a suit’s e-discovery cost allocation.10 Never-
theless, proposals for a universal taxation rule are not without merit
because many address the underlying causes behind the e-discovery
abuse phenomenon.11 Still, such a narrow approach to the problem
often excludes creation, third-party vendor, and review costs, and
therefore does not go far enough to dissuade requesting parties from
inflating the e-discovery bill.12 
Unsurprisingly, reforming the rules for allocating e-discovery
costs, particularly cost shifting, has become a popular topic among
scholars. Professor Redish has proposed a rule that would shift costs
for discovery requests involving a significant amount of information
that is not reasonably accessible to the producing party.13 Judge
Hedges has suggested, “If discovery is sought that is relevant to a
claim or defense, the producing party [should] bear the costs. If the
requesting party can show good cause for ‘expanded’ discovery under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), it [should] bear the costs.”14
Since 1994, Professors Cooter and Rubinfeld have advocated a
model in which the responding party would “bear the costs of
reasonable compliance up to a level deemed appropriate for this
class of cases, beyond which the reasonable costs of complying with
further discovery requests would shift to the plaintiff.”15
Regardless of the model, scholars have discussed the importance
of the “American” rule—which makes each party responsible for
their own litigation costs and effectively places the burden of e-dis-
covery on the producing party—and protecting American plaintiffs’
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See, e.g., Jacqueline Hoelting, Note, Skin in the Game, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1124
(2013) (highlighting the merits of adopting a universal rule to tax copying and scanning e-
discovery costs under § 1920).
12. See id. at 1120-21.
13. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 608 (2001).
14. Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of
Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 129
(2005).
15. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435, 455-56 (1994).
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rights to bring meritorious suits.16 Most agree that a pure “English”
rule, or loser pays rule, would make the litigation system inaccessi-
ble to poor and risk-adverse plaintiffs.17 Instead of filing meritorious
claims, plaintiffs would be too scared to risk losing the suit for fear
of having to pay for all of the e-discovery costs.18 In fact, some critics
take the extreme view that all cost shifting, both under § 1920 and
under any version of the loser pays rule, is too harmful and
oppressive to requesting parties.19 Others, like Professor Fitz-
patrick, simply highlight risks associated with cost shifting and
stress that cost shifting is not the only viable solution to resolve
current trends in discovery abuse.20
This Note proposes a new solution to the problem. Specifically, it
proposes a hybrid rule that would cap e-discovery costs paid by the
producing party at one-half the value of the claim in question. This
hybrid rule takes the best from both the American and English rules
and would balance plaintiff and defendant interests to make e-dis-
covery costs manageable and proportional to each suit.21 Producing
parties would be required to pay the e-discovery costs initially, as
the current American rule dictates. But because the hybrid rule
would shift the cost to the requesting party once the e-discovery
expenses passed the halfway mark, producing parties would be
shielded from exploitation—much like producing parties are
shielded under the English rule. The proposed hybrid rule would
therefore keep the incentives for plaintiffs to pursue meritorious
claims without fear of being stuck with the final e-discovery bill, but
also provide incentives for requesting parties to narrow their
discovery requests lest they surpass the cap and be required to pay
the rest of the bill. The rule would further encourage efficient
settlement and foster cooperation of both the parties to keep e-
discovery costs down across the board.
16. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 2, at 551.
17. See id.; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better
Way:” Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 887-88.
18. See Rowe, supra note 17, at 888-89.
19. See, e.g., Patrick T. Gillen, Oppressive Taxation: Abuse of Rule 54 and Section 1920
Threatens Justice, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 235, 271-75 (2012).
20. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1621, 1643-46 (2012).
21. See infra Part III.
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Part I of this Note sets out the background information and the
problem with rising e-discovery costs and e-discovery exploitation
under the status quo. Part II explains why the major reforms in this
field have failed to adequately address this problem. Part III
explains this Note’s proposed solution. Lastly, Part IV analyzes the
major counterarguments against the proposed solution.
I. THE RISING COST OF E-DISCOVERY
Advances in modern technology have caused the production of
information at incredible rates, which in turn has driven the cost of
e-discovery skyward. Due to major differences between traditional
discovery and e-discovery, chief among which is the sheer disparity
in volume of stored information, traditional discovery costs have
been far superseded by incredible modern e-discovery costs.
Requesting parties have capitalized on this trend and use it to force
arbitrarily high settlements from producing parties who have no
choice but to settle or pay the even higher price of e-discovery.
A. Key Differences Between Traditional Discovery and E-Discovery
There are a myriad of differences between traditional discovery
and e-discovery that explain the diverging costs. Traditional discov-
ery was designed mainly for managing paper documents.22 E-dis-
covery deals with electronically stored information (ESI).23 Applying
the traditional discovery rules to ESI has resulted in an explosion
in the volume of discoverable information. Simply put, companies
and people today store more information in electronic format than
was ever feasible via paper.
22. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 1 (2d ed. 2007),
available at http://perma.cc/A4GY-GVDV (explaining that traditional discovery handles
“information recorded on paper, film, or other media,” including the discovery of tangible
things such as physical objects, which can all be inspected “without the aid of a computer”).
23. Id. at 1 (“Electronically stored information includes email, web pages, word processing
files, audio and video files, images, computer databases, and virtually anything that is stored
on a computing device—including but not limited to servers, desktops, laptops, cell phones,
hard drives, flash drives, PDAs and MP3 players.”).
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First, the widespread use of technology results in the creation of
more information. Whereas companies and individuals certainly
documented important transactions and communications before the
computer age, the availability and pervasive use of computers, the
internet, email, smartphones, and scanning methods now allow for
documentation in a greater volume.24 Ordinary, day-to-day activi-
ties of companies now generate information which traditionally
went unrecorded.25 Business communication is a prime example.
Conventional means of communication such as the telephone, the
postal service, and even face-to-face interaction are often replaced
by e-mail, instant messaging, or collaboration software, all of which
leave electronic records.26 Consequently, communications not war-
ranting documentation before the widespread use of e-mail are now
commonly saved, backed up, and stored in company archives.27
The scope of this automated record trail is vast. As noted by one
commentator, “virtually every aspect of an employee’s daily tasks
creates some type of ESI.”28 In 2006, an average employee created
nearly 800 megabytes of electronic information.29 In 2007, the aver-
age employee sent and received 135 e-mails each day.30 Similarly,
24. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2218 (3d ed. 2014) (“[I]t has become evident that computers are
central to modern life and consequently also to much civil litigation. As one district court put
it in 1985, ‘[c]omputers have become so commonplace that most court battles now involve
discovery of some computer-stored information.’ ” (quoting Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D.
459, 462 (D. Utah 1985))); Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1108 (“Through the proliferation of use
of computers, the Internet, smart phones, and all other forms of technology, the volume of
information in existence is greater than ever.”).
25. See GEORGE L. PAUL & BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION: E-DISCOVERY
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (2006) (“Organizations have
thousands if not tens of thousands of times as much information within their boundaries as
they did 20 years ago.”); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 2.
26. See Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 174
(2006). 
27. See id.; see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 2.
28. Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1108.
29. Withers, supra note 26, at 173-74 (“Almost 800 megabytes of recorded information is
produced per person each year, 92% of which is in magnetically stored form, on computers or
computer storage media. To visualize this amount of information, it would take about 30 feet
of books to store the equivalent of 800 MB of information on paper.”).
30. LiveOffice, LiveOffice Survey Reveals Organizations Are Unprepared for E-Discovery
Requests (June 25, 2007, 8:10 AM), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/liveoffice-
survey-reveals-organizations-are-unprepared-for-e-discovery-requests-745509.htm
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a mid-sized company with 500 employees generated more than 17.5
million e-mails each year.31 And a single large corporation “can gen-
erate and receive millions of emails and electronic files each day.”32
This is made possible by the availability of cheap and effective
electronic storage. Communication that used to require file cabinets,
storerooms, and excess space can now be stored on external hard
drives or backup tapes requiring a tiny fraction of that storage
room.33 An average small business today has the electronic storage
capacity equivalent to 2000 four-drawer file cabinets capable of
holding 10,000 sheets of paper each.34 Bigger businesses frequently
store much more, utilizing thousands of large-capacity storage
devices with terabytes of storage space.35 Even though lack of space
often necessitated the shredding and disposal of old documents,
companies now often keep stored information “because there is no
compelling reason to discard it.”36 In fact, it may cost more to
effectively discard ESI than to keep it, as electronic forms of
information tend to be extremely difficult to eradicate completely.37
Moreover, ESI is stored in multiple formats and locations. It is
common corporate practice to use multiple storage devices to
manually back up the same information.38 Most companies also use
periodic, automated system backups, both as a safety net in case of
catastrophic loss, and as a way to archive data for later reference.39
Duplicate copies of the same material may be stored using internal
hard drives and files, external hard drives and backup tapes, system
[http://perma.cc/U5B6-GGF6].
31. Id.
32. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 2.
33. Id. (“While a few thousand paper documents are enough to fill a file cabinet, a single
computer tape or disk drive the size of a small book can hold the equivalent of millions of
printed pages.”).
34. PAUL & NEARON, supra note 25, at 5.
35. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 2.
36. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
37. See Withers, supra note 26, 174 (noting that the term “deleted” does not correspond
to “destroyed,” because deleted information is nearly always easily recoverable from metadata
or replicated copies); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that deleted
data can still be recovered until it is overwritten, leaving the vast majority of deleted data
accessible and discoverable).
38. MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ARKFELD’S BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR ESI PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
§ 3.4(B), (E) (2014-2015 ed. 2015).
39. Id. § 3.4 (E).
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storage, or online cloud computing.40 Multiple versions of a single
document are also saved and replicated over time to keep track of
edits, changes, and prior “snapshot” versions of a document.41
Similarly, ESI necessarily creates metadata, or additional data
about the documents not readily apparent from the screen view.42
This includes information such as who created the document and
when, prior history and edits, and who accessed the document and
when.43 Metadata is generated automatically, is often inaccessible
to the average computer user, and can contain an enormous amount
of information about a single document.44 Consequently, metadata
can be very costly to produce during discovery.45
Unlike traditional discovery, e-discovery places the economic
burden of finding, restoring, assembling, reviewing, and presenting
documents on the producing party.46 In traditional discovery, the
producing party was still required to locate the requested docu-
ments in the company’s storage system, assemble them in request
or business order, and present them to the requesting party for
inspection and copying.47 However, this process was relatively easy
and inexpensive.48 Furthermore, cost-sharing techniques helped bal-
ance the cost between the two parties because the requesting party
bore the cost of transporting, copying, and reviewing the documents
40. Id. 
41. Id.; THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 3, 60.
42. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 3.
43. Id.
44. Id. (“Indeed, electronic files may contain hundreds or even thousands of pieces of such
information. For instance, email has its own metadata elements that include, among about
1,200 or more properties, such information as the dates that mail was sent, received, replied
to or forwarded, blind carbon copy (‘bcc’) information, and sender address book information.
Typical word processing documents not only include prior changes and edits but also hidden
codes that determine such features as paragraphing, font, and line spacing. The ability to
recall inadvertently deleted information is another familiar function, as is tracking of creation
and modification dates.”).
45. Id. at 62; Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1110.
46. See Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of Pay-
Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1407 (2000).
47. Id. at 1386; Withers, supra note 26, at 181-82.
48. See Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Cost-Shifting in ESI Discovery Disputes: A
Five Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set Party Expectations, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 569, 569
(2009); Withers, supra note 26, at 181-82.
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for relevance.49 Conversely, equivalent cost sharing for e-discov-
ery—allowing the requesting party access to the producing party’s
computers, backup tapes and ESI storage systems—is not practica-
ble.50 As a result, producing parties now spend more time, resources,
and money at the production stage of discovery than ever before.
B. The Cost of E-Discovery
All of the aforementioned reasons fuel rising e-discovery costs.
But due to the growth of production costs, the lion’s share of e-
discovery bills must now be borne by the producing party—typically
the defendant. 
Production costs associated with e-discovery have grown exponen-
tially.51 The sheer volume of ESI—generated through the creation
of more data, the availability of cheap storage space, and the
practice of replication and duplicate backups—is enough to drive
production costs up.52 But producing ESI is also more expensive
because it “frequently requires restoration and even re-creation of
electronic databases from backup tapes, archives, and computer
hard drives.”53 Searching and locating the appropriate files is more
expensive, as is reproducing them in a readable format.54
49. See Withers, supra note 26, at 181-82 (noting that cost sharing techniques, namely
requiring the requesting party to review the documents for relevance, tilted the burden in
favor of producing parties).
50. See Jessica Lynn Repa, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business: Why the
Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 257, 268-69 (2004) (explaining that cost sharing is not feasible for many
reasons, including the need to restrict access for confidentiality, and because familiarity with
the producing party’s ESI storage system is often a prerequisite for locating relevant files).
51. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 550; Withers, supra note 26, at 182; Hoelting, supra note
11, at 1110-12.
52. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 565; Withers, supra note 26, at 182; Hoelting, supra note
11, at 1110.
53. Altman & Lewis, supra note 48, at 569; Withers, supra note 26, at 182 (“The costs for
the producing side, however, have increased dramatically, in part as a function of volume, but
more as a function of inaccessibility and the custodianship confusion.”).
54. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 565 (“Unlike paper documents, electronic data must be
processed and loaded into a special database before they can even be reviewed for potential
relevance.”); Withers, supra note 26, at 182 (“Organizations without state-of-the art electronic
information management program [sic] in place, which classify information and routinely cull
outdated or duplicative data, face enormous ... costs and burdens.”).
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Backup tapes are particularly problematic. ESI stored on backup
tapes is compressed to preserve space, so retrieving the information
first requires decompression of the entire tape.55 And because
“backup tapes often lack a directory or catalogue of the information
they contain, a party may need to search an entire tape—or perhaps
all of an opponent’s tapes—to locate a single file.”56 Because the
purpose of backup tapes is often to provide a disaster recovery
system, resources are not expended to organize the contained ESI
in a systematic manner or to allow for easy recovery of single files.57
The restoration of the tapes results in huge expenditures for the
producing party.58
Requests to discover metadata and deleted data are similarly
expensive. As noted by one commentator, “the metadata information
contained in a single electronic document can be enormous, and
thus very costly to produce.”59 This is precipitated by the fact that
recovering metadata requires techniques beyond those with which
the average computer user is familiar, and may require the use of
third-party vendors and forensic experts.60 Like metadata, deleted
data is less accessible and may be fragmented, likewise requiring
the use of forensics to restore and retrieve the data in a readable
state.61 Alternatively, deleted data may be retrievable only from
backup tapes or archives, adding to the cost of production.62
Producing parties also hire third-party vendors when the
company lacks the technical expertise or manpower to comply with
e-discovery requests. Companies without internal IT departments
or personnel may lack the needed knowledge and familiarity with
ESI and e-discovery procedures, making hiring a third-party vendor
55. See Altman & Lewis, supra note 48, at 569; Beisner, supra note 2, at 565.
56. Beisner, supra note 2, at 565.
57. See Sarah A.L. Phillips, Comment, Discoverability of Electronic Data Under the
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Effective Are Proposed
Protections for “Not Reasonably Accessible” Data?, 83 N.C. L. REV. 984, 990-91 (2005); see also
Withers, supra note 26, at 176.
58. Beisner, supra note 2, at 565 (“Restoring backup tapes for review can easily cost
millions of dollars.”); Phillips, supra note 57, at 991.
59. Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1110; see Beisner, supra note 2, at 570; see also THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 62.
60. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 40.
61. Id. at 18 (noting that “data that was ‘deleted’ but remains in fragmented form,
require[s] a modern version of forensics to restore and retrieve.”).
62. Phillips, supra note 57, at 991-92.
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specializing in e-discovery a necessity.63 Furthermore, producing
parties may simply be ill-equipped to handle broad e-discovery
requests, lacking proper software or personnel to adequately process
a court-sanctioned discovery request.64 Regardless of the reason,
hiring a third-party vendor has become the norm in most modern e-
discovery litigation,65 and it often accounts for a significant portion
of the producing party’s e-discovery bill.66
Lastly, producing parties typically spend an excessive amount of
money reviewing the assembled ESI for relevance and privilege
before sending it to opposing counsel. As the volume of ESI created
and stored has grown, so has the amount of time and resources that
producing parties must dedicate to reviewing the information at the
production stage.67 Under traditional discovery, both parties often
share review costs.68 Producing parties needed to conduct only a
cursory review of stored documents, and left the requesting party to
sift through boxes of files for relevant documents.69 Under e-dis-
covery, the producing party must now review for relevance up front,
especially if the ESI is not easily accessible and is located on backup
tapes or archives, is fragmented, or is imbedded in metadata.70 Doc-
ument review now accounts for the greatest portion of e-discovery
cost—estimated at roughly 70 percent of total e-discovery costs in
any given litigation.71
63. See ARKFELD, supra note 38, § 2.2(E); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 40.
64. See ARKFELD, supra note 38, § 2.2(E); Hoelting supra note 11, at 1111-12.
65. See ARKFELD, supra note 38, § 2.2(E); Hoelting supra note 11, at 1111-12.
66. E-Discovery Can Be Costly - But Not Doing It Right Can Cost Much More, E-DIS-
COVERY BRIEF (LexisNexis), Aug. 3, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/
b/e-brief/archive/2012/08/03/caution.aspx [http://perma.cc/9AFM-LCW3] (reporting that in
2012 vendor expenditures accounted for about 26 percent of e-discovery costs). See generally
Seth Eichenholtz, Pricing Processing in E-Discovery: Keep the Invoice from Being a Surprise,
PRETRIAL PRACTICE AND DISCOVERY, Winter/Spring 2011, available at http://perma.cc/AW94-
C3YG (describing the vendor costs of processing ESI).
67. See James N. Dertouzos, Nicholas M. Pace & Robert H. Anderson, The Legal and
Economic Implications of Electronic Discovery: Options for Future Research, RAND INST. FOR
CIV. JUST. 2-3 (2008), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/
RAND_OP183.pdf [http://perma.cc//PKG6-PTYQ].
68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
71. E-Discovery Can Be Costly Brief, supra note 66; see also Dertouzos, Pace & Anderson,
supra note 67, at 3 (indicating that document review of ESI can comprise up to 75 to 90
percent of additional e-discovery costs).
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Altogether, e-discovery costs in recent years have dwarfed tradi-
tional discovery expenses, with the producing party bearing the
brunt of the bill. In 2009, litigants spent an incredible $2.8 billion
on e-discovery, a 10 percent increase from 2008, and a 46 percent
increase from 2006.72 On average, a gigabyte of ESI costs from $125
to $6,700 to collect, from $600 to $6,000 to process, and from $1,800
to $210,000 to review.73 With a medium-sized suit typically involv-
ing 500 gigabytes of ESI alone, e-discovery will range the parties
between a total of $2.5 and $3.5 million.74 It is no wonder that e-
discovery costs are now typically higher than the potential reward
in many small-to medium-sized lawsuits.75 
The problem is exacerbated because the scope of discovery
requests is entirely in the control of requesting parties. Requesting
parties seeking information to build their case make initial requests
for production, generally free from all but the broadest relevance
constraints.76 Producing parties must then bear the cost of comply-
ing with these requests, including the costs of “interpreting the
demand, gathering the information, and formulating and delivering
a response.”77 And unlike attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs,
producing parties cannot limit their e-discovery expenses through
strategic planning and decision making.78 A producing party’s dis-
72. See Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1112 (citing George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Climbing
Back, L. TECH. NEWS (2010)).
73. E-Discovery Can Be Costly, supra note 66; see also Beisner, supra note 2, at 566
(noting that Verizon estimates that producing one gigabyte of ESI costs between $5,000 and
$7,000).
74. Beisner, supra note 2, at 566 (citing INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 29 n.2 (2008)).
75. See Altman & Lewis, supra note 48, at 569; Daniel M. Kolkey & Chuck Ragan,
Reevaluating the Rules for e-Discovery, L.A. DAILY J., May 21, 2010, at 1, available at
http://perma.cc/7RVL-CR33 (“[T]he costs of e-discovery have become disproportionate to the
value of the controversy at issue.”).
76. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 559-63; Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 779-80.
77. See Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 466 (1994); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
358 (1978) (“[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests.”).
78. See, e.g., Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 779 (explaining that a producing party
has “full decisionmaking power” to control its expenditures on legal fees and related costs but
no power to control the cost of complying with an opponent’s discovery request).
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covery costs are “determined not by the litigant himself but by the
scope and content of the request filed by his opponent.”79
Under traditional discovery procedures, requesting parties had an
incentive to limit their requests, at least somewhat.80 Because they
had to spend the time searching and reviewing the documents,
submitting narrower requests limited their review time.81 Under
modern e-discovery, the requesting party has no incentive whatso-
ever to narrowly tailor their requests.82 This is largely the product
of the current legal scheme governing the distribution of discovery
costs.
C. The American Rule Governing E-Discovery Costs
The current scheme governing the distribution of e-discovery
costs is obsolete. It is a specter of paper discovery. And at its heart
is the old American rule.
The American rule requires that each party to a lawsuit pays its
own litigation expenses, including discovery costs.83 This rule is
traditionally subject only to statutory and contractual exceptions,84
as well as a handful of narrower common law exceptions such as the
“obdurate behavior,”85 the “common fund,”86 and “private attorney
79. Id. (noting further that “none of those [e-discovery] expenditures benefits the
producing party’s own case. To the contrary, discovery costs benefit the requesting party and
actually impose both a financial and a legal detriment on the producing party”).
80. Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1111 n.48.
81. Id.
82. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 584-85 (“The most pernicious problem with the American
discovery system is that it incentivizes parties to seek overbroad and burdensome discovery.”);
Kolkey & Ragan, supra note 75, at 1 (“The result is little incentive exists to properly tailor a
document request, which translates into exorbitant discovery costs.”).
83. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 (2005); see also, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); ACMAT Corp. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 697, 701
(Conn. 2007); Tonti v. Akbari, 553 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Va. 2001); State Bd. of Tax Com’rs v. Town
of St. John, 751 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ind. 2001); Beisner, supra note 2, at 551.
84. See, e.g., ACMAT, 923 A.2d at 701; Tonti, 553 S.E.2d at 771; St. John, 751 N.E.2d at
659.
85. See, e.g., St. John, 751 N.E.2d at 658 (“[C]ourts impose costs upon defendants as a
punishment for bringing frivolous actions or otherwise acting in bad faith.”).
86. Id. (“[A]n award [that] benefits members of an ascertainable class, and the court
reimburses the prevailing litigant’s attorney fees out of that pool of money to prevent the
unjust enrichment of free riders.”).
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general” exceptions.87 By default, however, “the presumption is that
the responding party must bear the expense of complying with
discovery requests.”88 
The roots of the American rule lie in the premise that the system
cannot hold the threat of litigation expenses over the heads of
potential litigants, but rather should encourage meritorious
litigation.89 Such a rule may have been warranted under traditional
discovery, when the volume of information created was much
smaller,90 when technology limited the space and forms of data
storage,91 and when requesting parties had an incentive to narrow
their requests.92 But with the dramatic rise of e-discovery costs, the
American rule creates an incentive quite contrary to encouraging
meritorious litigation.
D. Exploitation of the American Rule
Plaintiffs have not been oblivious to the rising e-discovery costs
that producing parties must shoulder under the American rule.
They have capitalized on the rule by leveraging overbroad discov-
ery requests for favorable settlements. Instead of encouraging
meritorious litigation, the rule now encourages producing parties
to settle all cases to avoid high e-discovery costs.
The American rule leaves discovery open for exploitation by
requesting parties. Instead of tailoring their requests to discover
relevant information, requesting parties now have an incentive to
draft overbroad requests designed to inflate producing parties’ e-
87. Id. at 659 (“[C]ourts award fees to litigants who bring actions to protect important
social policies or rights.”).
88. Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 358; see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 (“Many states
generally follow the ‘American Rule.’ ”).
89. See Tonti, 553 S.E.2d at 771 (noting that the purpose of the American rule is to “avoid
stifling legitimate litigation by the threat of the specter of burdensome expenses being
imposed on an unsuccessful party”); St. John, 751 N.E.2d at 658 (quoting Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maler Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)) (“Since litigation is at best
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and the
poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”).
90. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
92. Compare supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text with supra note 82 and accom-
panying text.
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discovery costs.93 As Professor Redish put it, “the bigger the expense
to be borne by the opponent, the bigger the incentive to make the
request.”94 In fact, requesting parties go out of their way to find
remotely relevant ESI to request, even when it is unnecessary to the
litigation of the case.95 And as long as requesting parties meet the
relatively low requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1), there is little that producing parties can do except fund the
production costs or settle the case.96 The Supreme Court recognized
this problem in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, when it warned that
“the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants
to settle even anemic cases before reaching [summary judgment or
trial].”97
Consequently, the status quo also encourages frivolous suits.
Companies would rather settle a case than litigate to summary
judgment or a favorable verdict.98 Settling early on makes business
sense, especially if the requesting party has inflated the e-discovery
costs of a claim beyond the monetary value of the suit itself.99
93. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 2, at 584-85; Kolkey & Ragan, supra note 75, at 1; Redish
& McNamara, supra note 3, at 802-03; Withers, supra note 26, at 181-82; Hoelting, supra note
11, at 1113-14; Vlad Vainberg, Comment, When Should Discovery Come with a Bill? Assessing
Cost Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1523, 1533 (2010).
94. Redish, supra note 13, at 603.
95. Beisner, supra note 2, at 579 (“[P]laintiffs can still routinely engage in fishing
expeditions and compel the production of documents and information that are only
tangentially related to the claims or defenses at issue.”).
96. See Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1533 (“So long as a plaintiff could meet the minimal
threshold requirements of Rule 26(b)(1) for the discoverability of information, it could present
the defendant with a Hobson’s choice of funding prohibitively expensive discovery or settling
the suit.”).
97. 550 U.S. 544, 548 (2007); see also Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1533 (“For example,
when plaintiffs suing a small company realized that it held about 115 backup tapes in a small
warehouse, they strategically pushed the magistrate judge to grant their motion to compel,
presenting a $1.25 million price tag for the small company and resulting in an instant
settlement.”).
98. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 574 (noting that corporations pay billions of dollars each
year “to settle frivolous lawsuits because the burdens of litigating until summary judgment
or a favorable verdict are too onerous”).
99. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 802-03 (citing Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery
Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 193 (1992)) (commenting on discovery abuse through “forc[ing] favorable
settlements by driving up the other party’s discovery costs beyond the case’s value, calculated
in terms of the likelihood of a favorable outcome, the value of such an outcome, and the cost
of litigating the case to conclusion”); see also Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1113-14 n.76.
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Opportunistic plaintiffs take advantage of this and file frivolous
suits in hopes of securing a bloated nuisance settlement.100
These abuses must not be allowed to continue. The entire
litigation process is undermined when cases are settled not on their
merits, but on a party’s ability and willingness to pay for the e-
discovery.101 Abuse of the American rule has distorted the true
values of lawsuits and settlements, and thus undermined litigation
as an efficient means to settle disputes.102 The result is a system in
which a growing number of controversies are resolved through a
process lacking redeeming value.103
II. FAILED REFORMS
Legislators, courts, and commentators have voiced concerns over
the aforementioned problems for over a decade. Several solutions
and reforms have been implemented to try to stem discovery abuses.
To date, none have been comprehensive or truly effective.
A. 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
On December 1, 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended to recognize the role of electronically stored information
and the problems it poses in modern litigation.104 Among the goals
behind the reforms, the amendments aimed “to reduce the costs of
[electronic] discovery, to increase its efficiency, to increase unifor-
mity of practice, and to encourage the judiciary to participate more
actively in case management.”105 Unfortunately, the amendments
did not go far enough to address the source of the problem and left
100. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 593 (“Under the current system, even an entirely
frivolous lawsuit can compel a defendant to expend millions of dollars collecting, reviewing,
producing, and preserving records. Given the exponential rise in electronic discovery costs,
this possibility exerts enormous pressure on defendants to settle cases quickly.”).
101. See Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1113-14.
102. See Kolkey & Ragan, supra note 75, at 1.
103. Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 803.
104. See generally COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. c at
21-51 (2005), available at http://perma.cc/YS55-L4JZ (describing the proposed amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with a focus on ESI and its problematic proliferation).
105. Id. at 21.
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experts and litigants uncertain over the meaning of key
standards.106 Courts today remain divided over how to best distrib-
ute e-discovery costs.107
Notably, the amendments officially recognized ESI as a form of
discoverable information under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
34(a).108 Parties did not have to specify their need for ESI, and were
now entitled to ESI as long as they requested documents.109 Rule
34(b) mandated that ESI needs to be produced only in one
format—reducing replication costs—and specified a preference for
easily producible forms.110 Amendments to Rules 26(f)111 and 16(b)112
also required the parties to confer, meet, and cooperate over ESI
requests as early as practicable, make a reasonable discovery plan,
and include ESI issues in the scheduling order.
Most importantly, however, the amendments attempted to
provide a more efficient means to distribute e-discovery costs among
the requesting and producing parties. The reforms created a two-
prong proportionality test under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), which producing
parties can use to challenge particularly burdensome and expensive
e-discovery requests.113 First, the producing party must show that
the ESI the requesting party seeks is “not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost.”114 If the first prong is satisfied,
then the requesting party has a burden to demonstrate “good cause”
for producing that particular evidence in order for the court to
compel discovery.115 The court may then compel the producing party
to comply with the e-discovery request, but shift part or all of the
production cost onto the requesting party.116 Problems lie in the
meaning of the terms “not reasonably accessible” and “good cause.”
106. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 583-84; Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1115-16.
107. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 583; Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1558-59.
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); Withers, supra note 26, at 194-96.
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note.
110. See id. 34(b)(2)(E).
111. See id. 26(f) (dealing with cooperation about e-discovery issues at the pretrial
conference).
112. See id. 16(b) (providing a provision for disclosure or discovery of ESI in the content of
the judge’s scheduling order).
113. See id. 26(b)(2)(B).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note.
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The advisory committee’s notes and leading case law pose two
separate interpretations of how ESI can be reasonably accessible.
The leading case, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC looked at the
means of storage and held that active, online data on hard drives,
easily-searchable near-line data, and offline archives such as optical
disks are reasonably accessible.117 Backup tapes, disaster recovery
systems, legacy data, and deleted, fragmented, or damaged data are
not.118 The Rules and the advisory committee’s notes, however,
make no mention of specific storage methods.119 In fact, ESI stored
in accessible means such as offline archives may nevertheless be
“not reasonably accessible within the meaning of [Rule]
26(b)(2)(B).”120 Regardless, by function of both interpretations, all
data deemed reasonably accessible is ineligible for cost-shifting
mechanisms and must be produced.121
Courts similarly apply an inconstant standard for “good cause.”122
The advisory committee’s notes list seven factors for judges to weigh
good cause:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of
information available from other more easily accessed sources;
(3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely
to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed
sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive infor-
mation that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of
the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake
in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources.123
117. 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note; Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 319-
20.
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (“It is not possible to define in
a rule the different types of technological features that may affect the burdens and costs of
accessing electronically stored information.”).
120. W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D. Mass. 2007) (considering
factors besides storage—including lack of an indexing system—to determine whether the
requested ESI was not reasonably accessible).
121. See Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1117.
122. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 582; Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1117; Vainberg, supra
note 93, at 1558-59.
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
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As in the first prong of the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) test, Zubulake
provides a competing standard, this time in the form of a similar but
distinct “good cause” seven-factor test. Although the advisory
committee’s notes standard is similar to the Zubulake test, it ex-
cludes two Zubulake factors—the relative ability of the parties to
control e-discovery costs and the relative benefits of obtaining the
information.124 The test provided by the committee note also creates
a new factor not present in Zubulake, a “quasi-punitive measure,”
which favors cost shifting when a producing party converts accessi-
ble data into an inaccessible form after discovery obligations arise.125
Courts are split in the application of these two alternate tests.126
The functionality of the “good cause” prong is even more problem-
atic. The notes provide no guidance as to how each factor is to be
weighed.127 It is no wonder, then, that experts are perplexed as to
what “good cause” means.128 The Zubulake test, on the other hand,
clearly prioritizes the first two factors—or the “marginal utility
test.”129 As the court in that case stated, “The first two factors ... are
the most important.”130 The extent to which the e-discovery request
is specifically tailored and the availability of that information in
124. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (listing the
factors relevant to determining good cause as: “(1) the extent to which the request is
specifically tailored to discover relevant information; (2) the availability of such information
from other sources; (3) the total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
(4) the total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party; (5) the
relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information”); see also Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1560.
125. See Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1560.
126. See, e.g., W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 42-45 (D. Mass. 2007)
(applying the 26(b)(2)(B) test); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 106-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(applying the Zubulake test); Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 782 (noting that courts
are inconsistent in the application of cost-shifting tests); Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1117 &
n.110. Some courts have even applied a third test, established in Rowe Entertainment v.
William Morris Agency, Inc. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 782 n.38 (citing 205
F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
127. See Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1560.
128. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 582; Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the
New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 72 (2007); Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1525.
129. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 323.
130. Id.
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other sources then become the great bulk of the Zubulake test,
which seems contrary to proportionality aspect of the Rule.131 
Another major oversight is the amendment’s neglect of fishing
expeditions. Requesting parties can still make overbroad requests
to drive up the producing party’s costs without running afoul of the
rules.132 As one commentator on this subject explained, “[T]his rule
encourages plaintiffs to seek broad electronic discovery from sources
from which retrieving information will be costly, and to invent rea-
sons why such information is necessary or reasonably accessible.”133
Next, there is the fact that the good cause standard of Rule
26(b)(2)(B) and the proportionality test of 26(b)(2)(C) seem to be
redundant.134 Judge Scheindlin, who decided the Zubulake case and
at one time sat on the advisory committee, conceded that the test’s
seven factors “overlap the proportionality considerations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C).”135 Indeed, the 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) proportionality language136
is reminiscent of the seven-factor test promulgated in the advisory
committee’s notes.137 Similar concerns appear to have motivated
Judge Rosenthal when she lamented that “Rule 26(b)(2)(B) does not
create new authority for judges to limit discovery or to allocate the
costs of [e-discovery].”138 
These oversights combine to make Rule 26 an ineffective mecha-
nism for redistributing e-discovery costs. Perhaps it is for these
131. In fact, the court in Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis Inc. rejected the Zubulake prescribed
weight and modified the factors and their weight to emphasize the proportionality test of Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 229 F.R.D. 568, 573 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
132. See Beisner, supra note 2 at 583; Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1117; Vainberg, supra
note 93, at 1555-56.
133. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 583.
134. See Noyes, supra note 128, at 72; Phillips, supra note 57, at 986 (arguing that the 2006
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “good cause” amendment provided “no greater protection from discovery” than
the old proportionality test).
135. Noyes, supra note 128, at 72 (citing SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, E-DISCOVERY: THE NEWLY
AMENDED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (2006) (supplement to JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 2006))).
136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“[T]he burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of
the discovery in resolving the issues.”).
137. See id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
138. Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery after December 1, 2006, 116
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 181 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-few-thoughts-
on-electronic-discovery-after-december-1-2006 [http://perma.cc/T6NK-BHF6].
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reasons that very few courts have actually shifted e-discovery costs
under the 26(b)(2)(B) standard.139 Or maybe it is because courts
have “historically ignored proportionality concerns.”140 The fact
remains that the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have not met their purpose in making e-discovery more
bearable.  
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1920
In the absence of clarity in the 2006 Amendments, courts have
sought an effective means to balance the interests of requesting
parties to bring suit and maintain access to discovery against the
interests of producing parties to litigate claims on their merits. One
influential method has been to tax e-discovery under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920.141 
In recent years, federal courts have attempted to deal with rising
e-discovery costs through the power of Rule 54,142 thereby using the
mechanism of § 1920. Rule 54 allows that “[u]nless a federal statute,
these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than
attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”143
Producing parties have argued that this gives courts discretion to
award e-discovery costs to the prevailing party, and some have
pointed to the language in § 1920 that specifically grants courts the
power to award the costs of making copies.144 Yet, federal law
remains largely unclear as to whether e-discovery costs qualify
under § 1920.145
139. See, e.g., Hedges, supra note 14, at 127 (“The proportionality principle of Rule 26(b)(2)
... is not being utilized by judges.”); Redish & McNamara, supra note 3, at 780-81 (explaining
that the Rules’ “proportionality requirement has not proven to be an effective limitation on
the scope or costs of discovery”); Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1565 (noting that absent party
consent to bear some of the cost, courts are extremely skeptical of producing parties’ requests
to shift e-discovery costs under Rule 26(b)(2)(B)).
140. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 583.
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012) (“A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may
tax as costs the following: ... (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case .... A bill of costs shall
be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree.”).
142. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).
143. Id.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).
145. See Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1119-20. 
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Courts still widely disagree over whether Rule 54 and § 1920 give
judges the power to tax e-discovery costs to the prevailing party.146
As a result, different jurisdictions use different approaches to taxing
e-discovery under § 1920, or none at all.147 Some courts—such as the
Eastern District of Virginia, Eastern District of California, and the
Sixth Circuit—tax only scanning and copying costs.148 These courts
generally deny costs associated with creating documents, metadata
extraction, file conversion, and “[s]earching and [d]eduping.”149 The
Mann v. Heckler & Koch Defense, Inc. court also denied the produc-
ing party’s request to tax the creation of a database to effectively
present and search the produced ESI, because the creation of the
database did not “qualify as ‘copying’ for purposes of § 1920(4). ”150
Similarly, the court in Fells declined to tax the defendant’s costs
associated with “initial processing, Metadata extraction, [and] file
conversion,” reasoning that creation costs were not enumerated in
§ 1920.151
Other courts use § 1920 to tax copying as well as creation costs,
arguing that these tasks are both too expensive and necessary to the
e-discovery process to be left out. For example, one court opinion
noted that e-discovery costs related to preservation, collection,
processing, and production are the “21st century equivalent” of the
activities delineated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.152 In Race Tires America
Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., for example, the court awarded
costs to the prevailing party and stated that “the requirements and
expertise necessary to retrieve and prepare ... e-discovery docu-
ments for production were an indispensable part of the discovery
146. See Christopher Costello, Loser Pays—At Least the Costs of E-Discovery?, 11 DIGITAL
DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE 20, Sept. 29, 2011, at 1 (2011) (“The law, however, has been far
from clear as to whether such costs are ‘taxable costs’ that can be recovered by a prevailing
party under the Federal Rules.”); id. at 2 (“The extent to which such costs are recoverable
[under § 1920] is far from clear, particularly as it relates to eDiscovery.”); Hoelting, supra note
11, at 1119.
147. See, e.g., Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1119-21.
148. See, e.g., Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv11, 2011 WL 1599580 (E.D. Va.
Apr. 29, 2011); Fells v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Va. 2009); El Dorado
Irrigation Dist. v. Traylor Bros., No. CIV. 5-03-949, 2007 WL 512428 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007).
149. See Mann, 2011 WL 1599580, at *8.
150. Id. at *8-9.
151. Fells, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
152. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga.
2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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process.”153 Additional costs awarded under this broader interpreta-
tion of the taxing power of § 1920 include paying for third-party
vendors assisting in the production of e-discovery, as well as costs
which actually saved time and money for either party.154 
Still other courts have refused to tax e-discovery under § 1920 at
all. Notably, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that recovery
for litigation costs under § 1920 is possible, but they have denied
taxing various e-discovery costs as inappropriate.155 They rely solely
on the cost-shifting mechanism of Rule 26(b)(2)(B).156 As discussed
above, however, this effectively entails avoiding cost-shifting
altogether.157
As may be expected, parties have difficulty predicting the
outcome of § 1920 cases on e-discovery cost.158 Corporations with
business operations in multiple jurisdictions must prepare different
litigation strategies for what often amounts to the same storage of
ESI. Plaintiffs are given the opportunity to forum shop and file suit
in jurisdictions with the most favorable interpretations of the
statute. Additionally, the distinctions between what courts consider
taxable or untaxable under § 1920 are completely arbitrary. This
definitely does not comport with the principle that cost shifting
should assess whether “the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”159
Moreover, the status quo under most jurisdictions—except those
with the most liberal interpretations—still encourages settling
meritless claims to avoid expensive e-discovery bills and rewards
plaintiffs for meritless lawsuits. Requesting parties in most states
still have an incentive to file overbroad requests to drive up the e-
discovery costs. Although some producing parties in the few
jurisdictions with the most liberal interpretations might decide to
take the risk of refusing to settle in hopes of offsetting their costs for
153. No. 207-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620 at *9, *11 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012).
154. See Lockheed Martin Idaho Techs. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Advanced Envtl. Sys., No.
CV-98-316-E-BLW, 2006 WL 2095876, at *1-2 (W.D. Idaho July 27, 2006) (taxing costs for
creating a litigation database which organized the produced ESI).
155. See Gillen, supra note 19, at 247.
156. See Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1566.
157. Id.
158. See Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1114.
159. See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
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taxed costs under § 1920, most likely do not. The current trend of
taxing e-discovery costs under § 1920 does not address the root of
the issue, and e-discovery remains fundamentally unfair to
producing parties.
III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: A HYBRID RULE
In crafting an appropriate solution, it is necessary to find the
right balance between encouraging meritorious litigation and
discouraging discovery abuse. The 2006 Amendments attempted
this through the proportionality standards. Different courts have at-
tempted this through taxing various e-discovery costs under § 1920.
Still, among the various potential solutions, capping the American
rule strikes the most appropriate balance between favoring the
requesting and producing party. Given the nature and scope of the
problem discussed in Part I and the various difficulties with
alternative solutions discussed in Part IV, this Note proposes a
hybrid rule. This rule would cap e-discovery costs covered under the
American rule at one-half the value of the claim, after which the
loser in the litigation would pay the remainder of the e-discovery
cost.160 Like the current rule requires, producing parties would still
be responsible for paying the e-discovery costs up front.161 Upon
reaching a final judgment—whether that is summary judgment, a
verdict, a dismissal of the case, or otherwise—the proposed rule
would require the court to tax all e-discovery costs exceeding half
the value of the suit to the losing party.
A. Model Language for the Proposed Hybrid Rule
Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. The
producing party must provide and pay for discovery of electroni-
cally stored information up to one-half the value of each claim.
160. In this regard, the proposed model resembles the Cooter & Rubinfeld cost-shifting
model. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 15, at 455. There are two key differences between
this Note’s proposed model and the Cooter & Rubinfeld model. First, the threshold in this
Note’s model is always proportional to the value of the suit, whereas the Cooter & Rubinfeld
model proposes different thresholds for different classes of suits. See id. Second, under this
Note’s model, the excess e-discovery costs ultimately shift to the losing party, while under the
Cooter & Rubinfeld model the excess costs always shift to the requesting party. See id.
161. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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The requesting party must pay all e-discovery costs exceeding
one-half the value of the claim. On motion to compel discovery
or protective order, the producing party must show that the cost
of producing the requested information exceeds one-half the
value of the claim, but must nonetheless produce the informa-
tion if the requesting party pays the excess production cost.
Under this rule, requesting parties would have an incentive to
keep the e-discovery cost below the half-value cap, but could also opt
to request ESI expenses beyond the halfway mark if they were
willing to pay for it should they lose. This rule takes the best of both
the American and English rules, maintaining incentives for plain-
tiffs to file meritorious claims and incentives to keep e-discovery
costs down. It encourages cooperation among the parties and
promotes settlement.
To illustrate, consider this hypothetical: Plaintiff sues Defendant
for wrongful termination and age discrimination in employment
under state law, demanding $10,000 in damages. Under the
American rule, Plaintiff has an incentive to make broad e-discovery
requests, and requests Defendant to produce all company email
correspondence and interoffice memoranda from the past ten years.
Because of the nature of the suit and Plaintiff’s mitigation of
damages (for example, Plaintiff found employment elsewhere after
several months) Plaintiff can recover only so much in damages
under the relevant state statute, in this case a maximum of $10,000
in backpay damages. But by making such a broad e-discovery
request, Plaintiff can make Defendant incur e-discovery costs far in
excess of $10,000. For the purposes of this hypothetical, the cost of
complying with Plaintiff’s broad e-discovery request is $30,000.
Under the proposed hybrid rule, Plaintiff could still file suit
without having to worry about the initial e-discovery costs. Because
the suit is worth $10,000, however, Defendant is initially responsi-
ble for only the first $5,000 in e-discovery costs, or one-half the
value of Plaintiff’s suit. Any e-discovery costs in excess of the initial
$5,000 must be paid by the losing party. Thus, if Plaintiff pursues
the suit without settling and the jury rules for Defendant, Plaintiff
must pay the remaining $25,000 in e-discovery costs. Conversely, if
Plaintiff pursues the suit and wins, Defendant must pay the entire
$30,000 in e-discovery costs.
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By making producing parties responsible for all of the initial e-
discovery costs—up until half the value of the lawsuit, anyway—this
rule protects requesting parties. Plaintiffs have the same incentives
to file meritorious claims as under the American rule.162 Poor parties
could still initiate suits against wealthy defendants and large
corporations without fear of being stuck with the e-discovery bill.163
Because they would retain complete control over the scope of their
discovery requests, there would be little fear that the e-discovery
costs might snowball and surprise them at the judgment stage.164
The requesting party always retains the right to cut off further
discovery.
The incentives change, however, to the extent of discovery
requests. The cap encourages requesting parties to find sufficient,
relevant information within a narrower scope of discovery, or
alternatively to find enough evidence to be able to confidently
pursue their claim. As a result, parties would likely be more tactical
in their discovery requests, and narrowly tailor their requests to
discover only the most helpful and relevant information.165 The
same discovery rules would otherwise apply, so defendants would
have the same obligations to comply with the discovery requests and
could still motion for the same cost shifting mechanisms currently
available in their jurisdiction.166
Similarly, the hybrid rule protects defendants from exploitation
by capping the e-discovery cost for which they must bear responsi-
bility. This discourages overbroad requests and fishing expeditions
by plaintiffs seeking to leverage high e-discovery costs for favorable
settlements, because the producing party’s share of the e-discovery
cost will never be more than half the value of the suit in question.167
Consequently, both parties have a reasonable option to pursue a
162. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 173, 198-99 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 17-18, 89 and accompanying text; cf. infra note 195 and accompanying
text.
165. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 93-95 and accompanying
text.
166. See supra Part II. 
167. Unless the court uses its rare discretion to shift the entirety of the cost back on the
producing party as a sanction for abusing discovery or spoliation of evidence, or some other
similar extenuating circumstance.
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case where they believe that they truly have a stronger argument,
instead of settling for non-merit based reasons.168
Furthermore, a hybrid rule incentivizes parties to keep e-
discovery costs down across the board. Requesting parties have an
incentive to keep the cost within the capped amount in order to
avoid having to pay for e-discovery altogether. Producing parties
still have the same incentive to keep the e-discovery bill down
because they will not want to risk paying more if they lose. Parties
to cases with no “smoking guns” will be encouraged to settle instead
of heedlessly prolonging a case and risk paying a large e-discovery
bill as part of the judgment. 
The rule would also result in earlier settlements. Once requesting
parties hit the cap, which will become more likely with the rise of e-
discovery costs, they would have to reevaluate their position in the
case. If they have not found enough evidence to support their claim,
the incentive to settle is stronger than under the American rule,
which incentivizes charging more e-discovery requests to the
producing party’s account regardless the ability or possibility of
prevailing on the merits of the case.169 
Cases would be resolved more efficiently through a sliding-scale
cap, when the plaintiff’s midway reevaluation point would depend
on the value of the suit itself. Larger lawsuits requiring more ESI
will necessarily have a higher cap. Conversely, e-discovery costs for
small to midsize claims would now be kept proportional to their true
value, and requesting parties would no longer be able to extort
settlements in such lawsuits based on inflated discovery costs.170
Cases would be resolved more efficiently because excessive re-
sources would not be wasted on claims worth less than the e-
discovery bills.171
168. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 94-95 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Potential Problems with a Hybrid Rule
Of course, questions may arise regarding the placement of the
cap. This Note recognizes that the one-half mark of the value of the
claim may not be the exact, ideal threshold.172 Empirical studies
should be conducted to ascertain the optimal threshold where the
majority of discovery requests—average claims with modest needs
for ESI—receive protection from cost shifting under the sliding cap,
but when excessive requests are shifted to the requesting parties.173
Regardless of the placement, the cap should remain proportional to
the claim value for the benefits of both the American174 and
English175 rules.
Another concern with the hybrid rule is that it may create an
incentive to inflate the value of claims. Because the cap depends on
the value of the underlying claim, requesting parties may want to
inflate the value of the claim to squeeze out more e-discovery cost
utility. Similarly, parties may be encouraged to file more cross and
counter claims—each of which would have its own e-discovery costs
and inherent cost shifting mechanism—to further handicap the
opposing party with extra e-discovery expenses.
Yet, the incentive to inflate the value of the claim already exists
in present litigation. Savvy plaintiffs’ lawyers know that to start
with a stronger negotiating position during settlement talks, it is
necessary to claim a higher value in the initial pleadings than a
reasonable settlement value. Similarly, the incentive to file cross-
and counter-claims is already strong and will continue to serve as
172. This issue requires analysis beyond the scope and resources of this Note, which aims
to focus on the theory and principles of a hybrid solution to the discovery abuse problem
rather than the empirical analysis of the optimal threshold value.
173. Professor Redish attempts to balance these very interests by proposing a cost shifting
threshold between data not reasonably accessible and the less expensive, reasonably
accessible data. See Redish, supra note 13, at 608. Although this approach is effective at
protecting the producing party from the great expense associated with backup tapes and
fragmented data, it is less effective at dissuading expensive fishing expeditions using
overbroad requests for easily accessible data.
174. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
175. See infra Part IV.C.
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a strategic tactic to encourage settlement, discourage suits, and
keep damages down by offsetting e-discovery costs. Additionally,
courts and parties have access to precedent which provides some
measure of objectivity by which to compare and predict the value of
claims. As such, it is unclear that basing the cap off the value of the
claim will change the already existing incentives to overestimate the
value of the claim. Further, even if the rate of overvaluing claims
does increase, judges have experience valuing suits and can combat
overvaluation more effectively than discovery abuse.
Lastly, some critics may worry that low-value cases with dispro-
portionate needs for ESI will suffer. It does not always follow that
lawsuits worth a smaller amount will require a smaller amount of
ESI to litigate. E-discovery is expensive across the board, and most
suits will likely require a minimum e-discovery cost which request-
ing parties at the bottom of the case value spectrum may not be able
to meet with a half-value cap. This problem is easily fixed, however,
with the creation of a need-based exception to the hybrid rule. Since
such low-value cases are very unlikely to produce the e-discovery
costs that scare producing parties into settling anyway, an exception
to the cap would not be unduly burdensome.
B. Maintaining the Status Quo
Some critics may oppose a hybrid rule in favor of maintaining the
status quo. Certainly, there is something to be said for letting the
states try to solve this problem as independent laboratories of
democracy. Given that different jurisdictions are currently applying
different approaches, after a period of time, it might be easier to
determine which approach is working and which is not. Unfortu-
nately, e-discovery costs have been rising so rapidly that it would be
imprudent to wait years before adopting a uniform rule. Plaintiffs
and defendants alike benefit from a clear, universal e-discovery cost
distribution rule which will take both parties’ interests into account.
There are certain benefits to protecting the American rule. Plain-
tiffs are given the means to sue large corporations and wealthy
defendants, a phenomenon made more likely by requiring the
producing party to bear the majority of the e-discovery burden.176
176. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; cf. infra note 201 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, meritorious suits are not discouraged by the threat of
having to pay e-discovery bills.177 Encouraging meritorious litigation
is most certainly a laudable aim and is embraced by the goals of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.178 Specifically, Rule 1 was included
to embody the principle that litigation should not impose “excessive
burdens and costs on litigants and the court.”179
Furthermore, prevailing defendants are given the chance to
recover some of their e-discovery expenses by taxing costs under
§ 1920 in some jurisdictions, and by shifting costs under Rule
26(b)(2)(B) in others.180 The modern trend in taxing e-discovery costs
under § 1920 is likely to continue, as more courts adopt the holdings
of the Sixth Circuit, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the
Eastern District of California to tax copying costs against the losing
party.181 Other courts may adopt the § 1920 interpretations of the
Seventh Circuit, the Southern and Central Districts of California,
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and tax a broader array of
e-discovery costs for the prevailing party.182 Though there are
different interpretations, the trend seems to favor some cost shifting
to relieve defendants facing unreasonable costs or settling frivolous
claims.183 
Undeniably, however, the vast majority of U.S. courts have not
held e-discovery costs taxable under the powers of Rule 54 and
§ 1920. Most are still attempting to use the cost shifting mechanism
in Rule 26(b)(2)(B), or rather avoiding cost shifting under the rule
altogether.184 And although progress may come, not all believe that
177. Cf. supra note 89 and accompanying text.
178. See Kathleen L. Blaner, Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Donald H. Green, Federal Discovery:
Crown Jewel or Curse?, LITIGATION, Summer 1998, at 8, 8 (“Discovery was considered a crown
jewel because it sought to open the courts to all elements of society. The drafters saw an
imbalance of power between the wealthy and the poor. By mandating a full exchange of
information, the drafters thought that they could help less powerful litigants prove their legal
claims and thus redress the imbalance.”)
179. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at v.
180. See supra Part II.
181. See supra Part II.
182. See supra Part II.
183. See Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1119-24.
184. See Vainberg, supra note 93, at 1565 (“Yet while the amended Rules have not brought
uniformity, this Comment’s survey suggests that in the wake of their adoption, courts have
become more skeptical of cost shifting. They are more likely to shift costs only when the
requesting party volunteers to bear them or when the request is made of nonparties.”).
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§ 1920 and Rule 54 give the court the power to tax e-discovery in the
first place.185 If we choose to wait and see, we may be waiting a
while before the best solution rises above the e-discovery fray.
Meanwhile e-discovery abuse runs rampant and undermines the
entire judicial system.186
Moreover, none of the taxing approaches under § 1920 go far
enough. They do not adequately address the incentives under the
current rules, which encourage requesting parties to make
overbroad requests to drive up the producing parties’ cost.187
Copying costs are a pittance when compared to the full extent of e-
discovery costs the requesting parties can increase.188 Defendants
still have an incentive to settle when a plaintiff requests e-discovery
worth more than the value of the suit in question, regardless of the
potential to offset a fraction of that cost as copying costs under
§ 1920 if they prevail in court.189 Even the broader approaches that
tax both copying and creation costs under the statute do not begin
to chip away at the behemoth that is the cost of review for relevance
and privilege.190 A solution is needed which appropriately assesses
if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit.”191
C. The English Rule: Loser Pays
Another option would be to adopt the English rule, otherwise
known as the “loser pays” rule. Under a pure loser pays rule, all e-
discovery costs are awarded to the prevailing party as a part of the
judgment.192 Unlike the taxing approaches of some U.S. courts, this
rule includes the costs of third-party vendors, creation costs, and
even attorney fees for reviewing ESI. This discourages frivolous
185. See, e.g., Thomas Edge, Looking at the Small Costs, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 535, 555 (2012);
Gillen, supra note 19, at 235-38.
186. See supra note 101-03 and accompanying text.
187. See supra Part II.
188. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Copying costs were included in the average
cost to “process” a gigabyte of information.
189. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
191. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
192. See State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Town of St. John, 751 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ind. 2001);
20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 (2014).
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lawsuits and incentivizes parties to keep their requests narrowly
tailored to discover only relevant ESI.193 Yet this rule goes too far,
discouraging meritorious suits as well as frivolous suits and making
litigation inaccessible to the average plaintiff.
Proponents of the loser pays rule argue that it would be fairer,
because “victory is not complete in civil litigation if it leaves
substantial expenses uncovered.”194 The underlying theory suggests
that having to pay the e-discovery costs would undeservedly penal-
ize innocent parties upon winning their claims.195 After all, what
incentive is there to litigate at all—regardless of merits—if parties
must pay the prohibitive cost of e-discovery, win or lose? 
Appealingly, a pure loser-pays rule eliminates the perverse
incentives under the current system to drive up the costs of e-
discovery and file nuisance suits. Requesting parties would have to
weigh the possibility of losing, and therefore paying for the e-dis-
covery bill, before they submitted their discovery requests.196 They
would be much more likely to narrow the scope of their request to
discover only the most relevant information and minimize the risk
of having to pay for the bill if they lose.197 Defendants would refuse
to settle in cases in which they were assured of recouping their costs
upon a favorable outcome in the case.198
It is also possible that adoption of the loser pays rule would keep
e-discovery costs down altogether. Because payment would depend
193. See Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1121.
194. See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the
United States the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
361, 405 (1999).
195. See Sarah Wise, Show Me the Money! The Recoverability of Computerized Legal
Research Expenses by the Prevailing Party in the Federal Circuits, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 460
(2007).
196. See Steven C. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing Party?, 20
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537, 538-39 (2010); see also CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path,
Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (“Taxation of these costs will encourage
litigants to exercise restraint in burdening the [other] party with the huge cost of unlimited
demands for electronic discovery.”).
197. See Bennett, supra note 196, at 538-39.
198. See Costello, supra note 146, at 4 (“As a result, litigants will be less likely to file
lawsuits and/or claims of questionable merit ... or to force an opponent to incur substantial
eDiscovery costs in the hopes of forcing a settlement, when the plaintiff may well have to foot
the bill.”); Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1126 (noting that requesting parties “will be held more
accountable for bringing frivolous lawsuits” when they might be required to pay some of the
e-discovery costs).
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on winning, both parties might be wary of hiking up e-discovery
costs they might later have to pay.199 Parties would have to adopt
reasonable positions about e-discovery costs early on.200 Likewise,
parties might be inclined to settle, and settle early, due to their
mutual desire not to get stuck with the discovery bill.
Nonetheless, the loser pays rule brings with it major disadvan-
tages. Such a broad rule discourages not only frivolous suits but
meritorious suits as well.201 Plaintiffs with good claims would not be
willing to expose themselves to the risk of having to pay exorbitant
e-discovery costs if they lose, especially poor plaintiffs who have few
resources to fund their litigation strategy in the first place.202 These
concerns motivated lawmakers to reject the English rule in the first
place, in favor of a rule which opened up courts to bigger cross-
sections of society.203
Settlements also might not result in greater numbers under a
broad loser pays rule because defendants would already have an
incentive to cooperate. Because producing parties already have to
pay for the e-discovery costs if they lose, and oftentimes even if they
win, they already have an incentive to cooperate with requesting
parties to settle early.204 It is unclear that a loser pays rule would
impose additional incentives to cooperate.205
199. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 588 (“Application of the English rule to discovery dis-
putes would serve to ensure that neither party adopts an irrational position with regard to
discovery issues. Further, the risk of having to pay the opposing party’s expenses for
contesting a discovery request would help attorneys resist clients who urge them to adopt
unreasonable positions.”).
200. See id.
201. See Andrew Mast, Note, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28
U.S.C. § 1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 1825, 1826 (2010) (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC,
217 F.R.D. 309, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
202. Id.
203. See Beisner, supra note 2, at 587 (“This rule, designed to dissuade meritless lawsuits,
was rejected in the United States because of its propensity to limit access to the courts.”);
Hoelting, supra note 11, at 1131 (“The American judicial system jettisoned the English Rule
in favor of the American Rule based on the policy judgment that the imposition of costs acts
as an unacceptable barrier to meritorious litigation.”).
204. See Bennett, supra note 196, at 550-51 (noting that, under the status quo, “self-
interest generally should motivate responding parties to reduce discovery costs, since it is
unlikely that a party would ‘increase its costs unnecessarily without knowing that it would
prevail at trial.’ ”) (quoting Petersen v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 06-3084, 2009 WL 2163470, at
*4 (C.D. Ill. July 17, 2009))).
205. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The current rules regulating discovery are outdated and effec-
tively eclipsed through the emergence of electronically stored
information as the primary form of information requested in modern
litigation. ESI is created, replicated, and stored at astronomical
rates, driving the price of producing it during discovery through the
roof. Rising e-discovery costs have likewise spurred aggressive
discovery abuse. Requesting parties make overbroad requests, file
frivolous suits, and otherwise seek to intentionally drive the cost of
e-discovery up because the governing American rule places the great
bulk of e-discovery expenses on the producing party. By increasing
the producing party’s e-discovery costs, requesting parties force
inflated and nuisance settlements disproportional to the merits and
value of the underlying claim. Producing parties have no choice but
to settle or pay exorbitant e-discovery costs. As a result, the
litigation system is undermined as the efficient means to settle
disputes, and more cases are resolved on meritless grounds.
Courts and lawmakers have attempted to deal with this problem
in several ways. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
passed the 2006 Amendments, in an attempt to shift some of the
cost of burdensome e-discovery onto the requesting party. The cost-
shifting mechanism has been a resounding failure, however, causing
substantial confusion regarding its application. Federal courts have
attempted to resolve the problem by using the power of Rule 54 and
the ability to tax costs to prevailing parties under § 1920. Though
some jurisdictions have made progress in eliminating the perverse
incentives of the American rule, they are too few, too spread out,
and too divided among themselves to adequately address the issue.
Several potential approaches to solving the issue are plausible.
The first is to allow the courts to find the most efficient mechanism,
and then adopt that mechanism either through legislation or a
Supreme Court opinion. This is maintaining the status quo. And
although some jurisdictions have indeed made promising headway
in combating discovery abuse, the rest of the nation should not just
wait idly by and apply harmful rules resulting in adverse results.
Second, applying the English, or loser pays, rule would award the
costs of the entire e-discovery bill to the prevailing party. Such a
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rule would disincentivize frivolous claims and overbroad discovery
requests, keeping discovery costs down, but it would also close the
litigation system to poorer and risk-adverse plaintiffs. Discouraging
meritorious claims in such magnitude is unacceptable. 
Lastly, this Note supports the use of a hybrid rule, which would
cap the American rule at one-half the value of the underlying claim.
By using a sliding-scale cap, requesting parties would still be
encouraged to bring meritorious claims, but would also have an
incentive to keep their discovery requests narrow and tailored to
discover only the most relevant information. Producing parties
would still have to bear the initial discovery expenses up to half the
value of the claim, but would be shielded from the most expensive
requests and discovery abuse. The rule would promote efficient
resolution of lawsuits and encourage settlement proportional to the
merits and value of the suit.
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